Abstract. To scale agent technologies for widespread use in open systems, agents must have an understanding of the organizational context in which they operate. In this paper we focus on the issue of task valuation and action selection in socially situated or organized agents -specifically on the issue of quantifying agent relationships and relating work motivated by different sources.
Introduction
We believe that in order to scale-up agent technology [25] for use in open application domains, e.g., electronic commerce on the web, agents must model their organizational relationships with other agents and reason about the value or utility of interacting and coordinating with particular agents over particular actions. For example, a database management agent owned and operated by IBM 1 might have an extremely cooperative relationship with an information gathering agent owned by Lotus (Lotus is a subsidiary of IBM), but an entirely different type of relationship with a Microsoft information gathering agent -the IBM agent might prefer to service requests for the Lotus agent over the Microsoft agent or it might be willing to cooperate with the Microsoft agent if a higher fee is paid for its services. The agents might even coordinate via different protocols; the IBM agent might haggle with the Microsoft agent over delivery time and price whereas it might simply satisfy the Lotus request in short order and with a nominal or zero profit margin. Representing situations such as these is one aspect of our current research agenda. The overall objective is to expand the contextual information used by agents to make control decisions. Space limitations preclude a full description 
's Inter-agent Relationships , and
, as well as doing a local-only task (updating its source models). It also has the option of contracting out its update sources task to
. In order to compare these actions the agent requires a framework that quantifies and relates the different motivational reasons for performing particular tasks, as well as relating the costs/benefits of doing tasks for others, and doing local work, to the costs/benefits associated with contracting out the local update task. The complexity of the relationships that the agent has with other agents requires this complex approach to evaluation. The rationale for keeping the different motivational concerns separate is that they represent quantities that are not interchangeable, e.g., progress toward different problem solving objectives, akin to [33] . They are not reducible at all agents to some uniform currency and not all quantities have value to all other agents. For example, doing a favor for someone cannot in turn be used to purchase something at the local store. Another intuitive example: work done on one's yard has no intrinsic value to a professional peer, unless said peer is your neighbor. With respect to computational agents, partitioning of concerns like these maps to the balancing of local work with non-local work, but also to the balancing of work done to satisfy some . The idea of this research is not wholly to partition different activities, and the evaluation of their worth to the agent, but rather to support ranges of representations, e.g., tasks and actions that have both self-interested and cooperative motivations, or work relating to multiple different joint goals held by multiple agents related, at least partially, through different organizations.
In the sections that follow we present a model for relating different motivational factors, and different measures of progress, that enables agents to compare different types of actions, and the costs and benefits of particular courses of action. We then discuss the issue of interfacing this model with our existing agent control technologies and present ideas about how agents will make decisions based on this model.
Quantifying and Comparing Motivations
There are three different classes of tasks that a socially situated agent, such as © , must reason about: 1) tasks that are of local concern only and do not have direct value or repercussions in any non-local context; 2) tasks that other agents wish the local agent to perform; and 3) tasks that other agents may perform for the local agent. Obviously, there are graduations or tasks that pertain to more than one of these classes. For example, a task may produce a result that is valuable locally as well as having value to another agent. Additionally, each task may be performed for cooperative reasons, selfinterested reasons, or ranges of these. For example, performing a task for an associate for a nominal fee may pertain to both cooperative concerns and self-interested motivations. It is important to note that even actions performed for cooperative reasons actually have different motivations. For example, doing a favor for one's superior at work is evaluated differently than doing a favor for a peer, which is treated differently than doing a favor for persons unknown, and so forth. In order to address these concerns, we have developed a model for agent activities that quantifies these different motivational factors and enables the local agent to compare the factors via a multi-attributed utility function. Definitions:
Agents are autonomous, heterogenous, persistent, computing entities that have the ability to choose which tasks on which to operate, and when to perform them. 2 Agents are also rationally bounded, resource bounded, and have limited knowledge of other agents. Agents:
-Can perform tasks locally if they have sufficient resources.
-Interact through communication with other agents to perform tasks. For presentation clarity, we will cast discussion in terms of two basic interaction models: the local agent asking other agents to perform tasks, or the local agent performing tasks for other agents. -Agents interact via multiple different mediums of exchange known as motivational quantities ( § è ç s) that are produced by performing tasks, i.e., a given agent has belonging to an agent, it has a preference function or utility curve 4 ,
, that describes its preference for a particular quantity of the § è ç , i.e., 4 We currently view these as continuous functions but are exploring the possible need for stepwise utility functions that describe "saving-up" for a potential future event. 5 Astute readers will note that
. We partition these concerns to provide separate places for mapping different organizational and relationship-centered influences. 6 This simple model assumes that all utilities associated with different motivational quantities can be mapped to a common denominator at the agent. This does not mean that the same mapping is possible at all agents, nor do we feel this property is necessary for the model. It is intended to simplify presentation and model manipulation at this time. 
Tasks are abstractions of the primitive actions that the agent may carry out. We return to the issue of abstraction in Section 4. Tasks:
-Require some time or duration to execute, denoted
, for task performance beyond which performance of said task yields no useful results. (This could also be defined via a function that describes a gradual decrease in utility as 
. These quantities are positive and reflect the benefit derived from performing the task. They may be the direct outcome of performing the task, i.e., some result produced by doing the actual work, or they may be quantities that another agent is paying for the work to be performed. In this model, the two are equivalent.
-Tasks may have multiple § è ç production sets; that is a given task may produce different groups of "calling-in" a favor, or for some combination of these. The multiple § è ç production sets are represented: Consumption sets model the idea of tasks consuming resources, tasks hindering progress toward some objective, and agents contracting work out to other agents, e.g., paying another agent to produce some desired result or another agent accumulating favors or good will as the result of task performance. In contrast to production sets, consumption sets are the negative side of performing a particular task. 7 The issue of which f À g ÷ ø from the candidate sets will pertain to a given transaction can be viewed as an issue for explicit negotiation between agents [20, 7] , or as a dynamic agent choice problem [40] . To illustrate, Figure 5 that is produced by performing the task for 8 7 (i.e., the increase in § è ç . In order to properly assess the value of such an arrangement, the agents need to use the model presented in this section for comparisons, but, to add components such as opportunity cost or future value to the selection / decision process. We return to this issue in Section 5.
In this section we have presented a model for comparing tasks that are motivated by different factors. The model can support comparison between tasks that are performed for other agents in return for financial gain to tasks that are performed for other agents for cooperative reasons. Via the different preferences for the different quantities, agent control can be modulated and agents can reason about mixtures of different task types and different motivations. s. The use of utility for this application is flexible and very general, though to effectively use the model we must address how to meaningfully plan and reason with the model and how to integrate it into existing agent control technology. We return to these issues in Sections 4 and 5.
Incorporating Organizational Structure and Influence
The § è ç model enables the direct comparison of work motivated by variety of different sources, and it supports ranges of these. The model also supports the integration of certain classes of organizationally derived influence and structure. For instance, organizational relationships can be associated with particular § è ç s, i.e., agents belonging to a particular organization and interacting for a particular organizational goal can track their contributions and joint progress (either by communication or by observation) toward the goal using an § . The notion of "limited extent" in the previous sentence points to another place where organizational structure maps into the § è ç -centric model; the preference functions or utility curves of the agent reflect the relative importance of particular types of problem solving activities to the agent. For example, a type of problem solving that is very important to the agent will have a steep utility curve relative to its other concerns; this approach also pertains to power relationships between agents. Organizational influences and relationships can also be mapped to ² , or to the ¹ functions used in the utility mapping of Equation 1.
Organizational structure imposed on the computation also comes into play in the initial assignment of Ü Þ ' s (quantities of § è ç s) to agents. Note that since work is produced over time, the system is not a zero sum game, but instead is a growing economy. The initial allocation of § è ç s to agents predisposes the system to initialize in a particular way and biases the flow of the distributed computation, as in [33] . Agent communication also has roles in this model. Negotiation [20, 30, 7] between agents can be used to select which § è ç s, from a set of candidate § è ç Ø / § è ç ó g Ø , will be used for a given exchange or produced by a given task execution. Negotiation can also be used to determine the "price" (in § è ç s) or quantity that a particular transaction will produce. Auctions or other market mechanisms [43, 9, 6] can be integrated with the model through this avenue.
Integration with Detailed Agent Control
The § è ç model is deliberately abstract to simplify control reasoning at the meso-level of agent control [34] 8 , i.e., the computational organizational level rather than the microlevel. While it could be used directly at the micro-level of agent control, the agent would be unable to reason about a wide class of issues that are important for socially situated, resource bounded, agents. The model lacks features such as explicit representation and quantification of interactions 9 between tasks and a detailed view of the actions that may be used to carry out the tasks. We generally subscribe to a model where agents have alternative ways to perform tasks (or achieve goals), and that part of the agent control problem is to evaluate the different possible ways to perform a task, taking into consideration the different trade-offs or performance characteristics, and to select one or more from the set of alternatives. Additionally, detailed and complex interactions between agent activities, such as chains of interactions, motivate detailed coordination between agents. This detailed, quantitative, temporal, constraint and interaction based view of the world is embodied by research in TAEMS [17] , Design-to-Criteria (DTC) [41, 39] agent scheduling, and GPGP [16] agent coordination.
The existence of such sophisticated, quantitative, machinery for agent control begs the question of why the § è ç -centered model is necessary. The detailed technologies are well suited to representation and control at a particular level of detail (micro-level). However, TAEMS is designed to represent a quantified view of the problem solving process of an agent -it does not lend itself to organizational level issues in its current form. Enhancing TAEMS for organizational level application may be possible, though because the class of issues is inherently different at the organizational level, we believe a new structure coupled with a new reasoning process is appropriate. The integration of the organizationally centered § è ç framework with the detailed tools is akin to other recent work in integrating process-program controllers [27] and opening the detailed tools for use with BDI problem solvers [8, 35] and others [42, 29] . The general view is that the higher-level components are responsible for influencing the selection of candidate tasks for the agent, while the detailed tools (GPGP/DTC) reason about satisficing, real-time, detailed, temporal control or implementation of the selected tasks and goals. Space precludes a detailed discussion, more information is available in [39] .
Conclusion and Future Directions
The model presented here is currently under development and integration. Recent extensions [39] include the addition of multiple alternative performance profiles for § è ç tasks and support for an approximate § è ç scheduling process. The scheduling process [39] includes facets that factor-in the future value of § è ç s, temporal issues, and opportunity costs. The potential importance of future value is illustrated in tit-for-tat agent coordination [36] and other cooperative games [32] . Opportunity cost plays a role in task selection, as well as the evaluation of long-term contracts [30] and negotiation [20, 7] over the terms (time and § è ç ± Ö ) of said contracts. Reasoning about decommitment penalties or costs [1] also factors into the model at this level.
Regardless of the underlying scheduling technology, the model stands on its own merits as a way to quantify and relate hereto unrelated concerns like cooperative and self-interested motivational factors. Using the model, agents can reason about different concerns like self-interest, favors, altruism and social welfare [14] 10 . The model also frames the problem of balancing these different motivations, as well as balancing work between different organizational entities, the individual and the community [24] , and balancing different agent relationships. It is important to note, however, that the model requires detailed information about tasks, organizational goals, § è ç Ö , and the utility functions of each individual agent. Certain classes of this information could be learned though in the general case this falls on the designer(s) of the multi-agent system. Obviously, design principles that guide such a process are desirable.
While the § è ç model is related to research in social welfare, utility, and choice [22, 14, 4, 7] , the model differs in its use of a local, state-based (contextual), view of the larger organizational issues. In the § è ç framework, agents reason about the utility of particular actions based on their local view of organizational objectives expressed via § è ç s and utility functions. Inherent in the framework are the assumptions that: 1) agents have imperfect knowledge of the problem solving taking place at other agents; 2) the utility function of a given agent cannot generally be shared and computed by other agents because it is dependent on the agent's problem solving state; 11 3) globally appropriate behavior can be approximated through local reasoning in the spirit of [10] . In this latter case, the precision of the approximation is dependent on the degree to which agents can communicate or observe problem solving toward organizational objectives. Distinctions made, there is a relationship between the model and research in social welfare, utility, and choice. In a sense, § è ç s might be used to approximate and implement social utility functions in multi-agent systems populated by complex problem solvers. It might also be reasonable to combine the technologies online, where formal views of social utility are used to determine § è ç allocations and § è ç utility functions, or where social utility is used in the organizational design phase to weight organizational objectives for the § è ç level. There are also important empirical lessons that can be learned from the large body of research in social utility and social welfare.
The model also relates to other recent work in the multi-agent community, such as agents interacting via obligations [2] , or notions of social commitment [11] , but it differs in its quantification of different concerns and its dynamic, contextual, relative, evaluation of these. The model resembles MarCon [33] as the different degrees-ofsatisfaction afforded by the § è ç model is related to MarCon's constraint optimization approach, and MarCon too deals with utilities/motivations that cannot always be commingled. MarCon, however, views constraints as agents, assigning particular roles to particular agents, and the issue of which tasks to perform do not enter into the problem space. 10 All mapped to different f À g s or groups of f À g s. However, the issue of how to specify systemwide goal criteria, or organizational-level goals, that characterize acceptable ranges of these must also be addressed to employ f h g s to concepts like social welfare in a meaningful fashion. 11 To share such a function requires full exchange of the agent's knowledge structures and its objectives and that the receiving agent engage in the same (generally) exponential planning/scheduling computation that the sending agent uses to decide on its course of action (and that the receiver thus does this for every agent with which it interacts). In other words, we take the view that the computation of the utility that a different agent associates with a particular task is not generally feasible in complex real-time resource-bounded problem solving agents (there are also obvious issues of privacy and heterogeneity).
Evaluation of the § è ç framework has two facets: modeling and scheduling. Evaluating the scheduling of § è ç s is straightforward. Though not generally tractable, the space of possible § è ç schedules can be produced exhaustively and the output of any approximate § è ç scheduling process can be directly compared to the provably optimal solution. Evaluating the modeling aspects of the § è ç framework is more subjective. The questions that must be answered are 1) does the model express desired situations, 2) does reasoning with the model enable the agent to act appropriately given the situation described in the model. If we assume no calculation errors in computing utilities for § è ç tasks, case two reduces to case one. The real question is whether or not the model maps well to the situations for which it was designed. Because of the model's somewhat unique integration of local control combined with temporal constraints and utility, it is difficult to compare it directly to other work in social choice. We are currently experimenting with the representational strength of the model. Preliminary results can be found in [39] .
Many other research questions remain. Aside from the obvious (and deliberate) lack of prescriptive semantics for the model, one of the outstanding issues is how to best leverage the model from a decision making standpoint, i.e., how to incorporate the model into a high-level decision process that can then be integrated with the rest of our agent control technology as discussed in Section 4. Another obvious question is how to translate organizational goals and objectives into § , and local agent utility curves. Currently, this process is being explored by hand, though an automated organizational design process [3] is a future possibility once the issues are better understood. In terms of limitations, the primary issue is the relative "youth" of the § è ç framework. While the local, state-based view appears appropriate for certain classes of agent control, it has yet to be employed in a wide range of projects and situations.
